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Abstract
As infectious disease outbreaks emerge, public health agencies often enact
vaccination and social distancing measures to slow transmission. Their suc-
cess depends on not only strategies and resources, but also public adherence.
Individual willingness to take precautions may be influenced by global fac-
tors, such as news media, or local factors, such as infected family members or
friends. Here, we compare three modes of epidemiological decision-making
in the midst of a growing outbreak. Individuals decide whether to adopt a
recommended intervention based on overall disease prevalence, the propor-
tion of social contacts infected, or the number of social contacts infected.
While all strategies can substantially mitigate transmission, vaccinating (or
self isolating) based on the number of infected acquaintances is expected to
achieve the greatest herd immunity and number of infections averted, while
requiring the fewest intervention resources.
1. Introduction
As outbreaks emerge, public health agencies often implement a variety of
pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions to prevent epidemic
expansion, including vaccination and medical prophylaxis, school closures
and other social distancing measures, and information campaigns to pro-
mote awareness, hygienic precautions and voluntary isolation [1, 2, 3, 4].
However, such measures require population adherence and are often hindered
by failure to take recommended actions [5]. Around the globe, for example,
seasonal influenza vaccine coverage falls significantly below the 75% baseline
recommended by the World Health Organization, but varies widely between
countries and across age groups [6]. In the USA, 2015-2016 uptake was only
59.3% in children and 41.7% in adults [7]. For measles, routine childhood
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vaccination is declining in Texas and other areas of the United States where
personal belief and other non-medical vaccination exemptions are allowed
[8, 9, 10]. Parental decision-making regarding childhood vaccines is complex
and context dependent [11], but likely influenced by false claims regarding
vaccine safety, low perceived risks of infectious diseases, and other forms of
misinformation from the ”anti-vaxxer” movement [8, 11, 12, 13]. Recently,
there have been calls for a special government commission on vaccine safety,
despite overwhelming scientific consensus that vaccines are both safe and
effective [12, 14, 15, 16].
As outbreaks unfold, people can take a variety precautionary measures to
avoid infection, including immunization and social distancing [1, 17, 18, 19].
They often judge personal risk based on their impressions of overall disease
prevalence and severity [2, 20, 21, 22]. When infection risk appears low, small
risks of adverse affects from the vaccine can seem relatively important and
cause vaccine coverage to drop below levels required to control transmission.
A variety of other factors can influence the perceived utility of disease pre-
vention, including epidemiological news and rumors, costs of vaccination and
other control measures, trust in health professionals, government agencies,
media and non-official information sources, as well as societal pressure to
ensure the health of one’s children [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
Studies have shown that media reports about outbreaks that specify num-
bers of cases, hospitalizations or deaths, can influence avoidance behavior
and contact patterns at both individual and community levels. In some
cases, oversimplified media reports regarding flawed vaccines can trigger pan-
ics that lead to drops in vaccination and vaccinated mixing with the infec-
tives without regard to disease risk [29, 30, 31, 32]. For both seasonal and
pandemic influenza, such interactions between vaccination decision-making
and transmission dynamics can profoundly shape the course of epidemics
[20, 33, 34, 35].
Individual intervention decisions can have far-reaching effects. For exam-
ple, vaccination protects not only the immunized individual, but also social
contacts who might have been infected by the individual; social distancing
decisions may break chains of transmission by protecting the decision-maker
and more generally disrupting social dynamics. The extent of herd immunity
(indirect protection) will critically depend on contact patterns [36, 37]. Mea-
sures taken by gregarious individuals may have greater immediate benefits
than those taken by solitary individuals, with downstream epidemiological
consequences modulated by the full social network [38, 39]. Contact pat-
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terns may also influence the decision-making process itself, by constraining
epidemiological perspectives. When gauging infection risk, individuals may
consider global information (e.g., from news media) or first-hand encounters
with disease (e.g., infected acquaintances, friends or family members) [29, 30].
While traditional compartmental models assume homogeneity in both epi-
demiological risks and intervention benefits, network-based models provide a
tractable framework for studying the complex interplay between contact net-
works, intervention decision making and disease transmission [33, 40, 41, 42].
Here, we investigate the epidemiological impacts of different decision
paradigms using a network-based SIR epidemic model, in which individu-
als make vaccination or social distancing choices based on their perceived
epidemiological risks. Depending on the decision model, they estimate ei-
ther overall disease prevalence, their number of infected social contacts, or
their fraction of infected social contacts. When the perceived threat is suf-
ficiently high, they take a measure that immediately affords full protection
for the duration of the epidemic. We compare the efficacy of these three
different paradigms across a range of diseases in a realistically heterogeneous
network, and show that the most naive model–simply counting one’s infected
contacts–affords the most epidemiological protection using the least amount
of resources (e.g., vaccinations or economic costs associated with social dis-
tancing).
2. Methods
We simulate the spread of an infectious disease in a network (population)
with an exponential degree distribution–as estimated for typical urban pop-
ulations [41, 52]–using a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) chain-binomial
model [36, 43]. At each time step, individuals decide whether or not to
take an instantaneously protective action to avoid infection, based on their
perceived risk of infection, as defined by the given local or global decision
model. We assume that there are sufficient resources to immediately protect
any willing individuals.
2.1. Contact network
We model contact patterns in the population using an exponential net-
work with N = 10000 nodes and mean number of contacts µ = 10 [44], gener-
ated according to the configuration model [45], unless otherwise is specified.
We assume that this network constrains both disease transmission and local
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risk perceptions, when individuals monitor infected social contacts. To eval-
uate the impact of network topology, we also analyze the SIR-intervention
dynamics on a homogeneous random graph (all nodes have same degree) and
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [46], with degree distributions constrained
to achieve the same epidemic threshold as the focal exponential network. All
three networks share Tc =
〈k〉
〈k2〉−〈k〉 = 0.056 where 〈k〉 and 〈k2〉 are the average
degree and squared degree in the network, respectively.
2.2. Epidemic dynamics
We model SIR transmission dynamics of a flu-like disease using chain-
binomial stochastic simulations [36, 43]. Epidemics begin at time t = 0 by
infecting a single randomly chosen node in an otherwise completely suscepti-
ble population and terminate when there are no remaining infected individ-
uals. Individuals remain infectious for l = 7 days before recovering with full
immunity to future infection [47, 48]. Infected individuals transmit disease
to each susceptible contact at a rate β. Immunized and recovered individuals
are assumed to be fully resistant to infection. Results are averages over 500
simulations, unless otherwise specified.
The basic reproduction number (R0) is the expected number of sec-
ondary cases when a single case of disease is introduced into a naive pop-
ulation, and is related to the epidemic growth rate. To study the im-
pact of transmission rate on the vaccination-epidemiological dynamics, we
consider R0 values ranging between one and ten, which spans the range
for many common human pathogens, including influenza, Ebola, SARS,
Pertussis, HIV/AIDS, Mumps, Rubella, Polio, Smallpox, Diphtheria, etc
[49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57]. For each value of R0, we determine the
corresponding β using [40]
R0 = T
(〈k2〉 − 〈k〉
〈k〉
)
, (1)
where T = 1−(1−β)l is the transmissibility over the entire infectious period
and 〈k2〉 is the mean squared degree of nodes in the network.
2.3. Immunization models
We assume that individuals make daily decisions regarding whether or
not to take precautionary measures based on their perceived risk (Figure 1).
If and when they choose to take action, they instantly gain full resistance
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to infection for the remainder of the simulation. Although these models
apply to any transmission preventing measure, we henceforth refer to the
interventions as vaccinations.
Figure 1: Three decision strategies. Individuals decide to vaccinate based on one of three
risk measures: The number of infected contacts (local count), the fraction of infected
contacts (local prevalence), or the overall fraction infected (global prevalence). In this
example, six of the 24 nodes are infected, yielding a global prevalence of 0.25. The white
node towards the top has a single contact that happens to be infected; the white node
towards the bottom has two of its five contacts infected.
We model three different individual decision strategies in which individ-
uals consider either the disease states of their direct social contacts or the
global situation, perhaps gleaned through news or social media. Let vi(t)
denote the willingness of a individual to vaccinate under strategy i at time
t.
2.3.1. Local decision strategies
In the first model, local prevalence, individuals assess infection risk by
tracking the fraction of their social contacts that are currently infected. The
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probability that a susceptible individual i vaccinates at time t is given by
vlp(i, t) = 1− (1− T )
ηi(t)
ki
×〈k〉
(2)
where ηi(t) is the number of neighbors of i that are infected at time t, ki is
the total number of neighbors (degree) of i, and 〈k〉 is the average degree of
the network.
In the second model, local count, individuals track their number rather
than proportion of infected neighbors, and decide to vaccinate according to
vlc(i, t) = 1− (1− T )ηi(t) . (3)
Local prevalence is arguably a less plausible than local count, given that
the decisions require the additional knowledge of total number of contacts
(degree) of each individual.
2.3.2. Global decision strategy
The global prevalence model assumes that individuals base their vaccina-
tion decisions on the epidemiological state of the entire population, as given
by
vg(i, t) = 1− (1− T )
I(t)
N
×〈k〉, (4)
where I(t) is the total number of infected individuals in the population at
time t and N is the size of the population. This assumes general knowledge of
the evolving dynamics of the epidemic, perhaps through news, social media
or public health messaging.
The mean degree (〈k〉) appears in the global prevalence and local preva-
lence as a normalizer. If node i has the average degree (ki = 〈k〉) and its
local prevalence mirrors global prevalence (ηi(t)〈k〉 =
I(t)
N
), then it will have the
same probability of vaccinating across all three models.
In all three models, we assume that individuals will vaccinate with a
probability equal to their perceived real-time probability of being infected.
For example, if an individual believes that they have a 25% chance of being
infected in the immediate future, then they will take precautionary measures
with probability 0.25. The local count model comes closest to estimating
actual risk of infection. Specifically, vlc is the probability that any currently
infected contact will transmit disease to the focal node at some point during
his or her infections period. This exactly estimates risk if all infected con-
tacts were just infected and at the beginning of their infectious period, but
overestimates risk if some are nearing recovery.
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2.4. Herd immunity
To assess the indirect and direct protection afforded by a given decision
strategy D at a given R0, we calculate a quantity we call herd immunity,
given by
H(D,R0) =
〈C0(R0)〉 − 〈CD(R0)〉
〈VD(R0)〉 , (5)
where 〈C0(R0)〉 and 〈CD(R0)〉 are the expected total number infections in epi-
demics without vaccination and with vaccination decision strategy D, respec-
tively, and 〈VD(R0)〉 is the expected total number of individuals vaccinated
under D. We estimate these expected values by averaging over 500 simula-
tions with the specifiedR0 and decision model. Barring extreme stochasticity,
we expect H > 0 for any reasonably protective vaccine strategy. When H
is between zero and one, more vaccines are given than infections averted,
suggesting that vaccines may be mistimed or misplaced. This could happen,
for example, if risk is underestimated early in the epidemic and overesti-
mated late in the epidemic. An H near one indicates that approximately
one infection is averted for every vaccine given. Note that this is an average,
and does not necessarily mean that every vaccination prevents infection of
the recipient. If each vaccine averts, on average, greater than one infection
(H > 1), then the value of H corresponds to the level of indirect protection
or herd immunity achieved by the decision strategy.
3. Results
The decision models yield distinct vaccine adoption and disease trans-
mission dynamics (Figure 2). As disease begins to spread, individuals per-
ceive increasing risks and vaccinate according to the decision model, thereby
protecting themselves and interrupting potential chains of transmission to
others. While all three strategies reduce the total number of infections, the
local count strategy affords the greatest and most efficient protection of the
three. Under the global prevalence strategy, perceived risk is homogeneous.
As cases mount, the vaccination rate rises synchronously throughout the
population, arguably resulting in too much too late vaccine coverage.
The local strategies avert more infections with fewer vaccinations than
the global strategy. As epidemics unfold, risk is both heterogeneous and
dynamic, with some portions of the network experiencing greater forces of
infection than others. Local decision-making allows earlier detection and
7
Figure 2: Disease and vaccination dynamics under different decision models. Shading
indicates the fraction of nodes in each state: susceptible (black), vaccinated (light gray),
recovered (dark gray), infected (white). Columns corresponds to different strategies, as
labeled above; rows correspond to R0 = 2 (top) and R0 = 5 (bottom).
response to increasing personal risk, and prevents unnecessary vaccination
in lower risk settings, both prior to and following epidemic waves. The lo-
cal count strategy is more protective than the local prevalence strategy. By
tracking the number rather than proportion of infected contacts, individuals
more accurately assess the local force of infection. For example, compare a
solitary individual with just two social contacts and a gregarious individual
with 20. If they both have two infected contacts, then their risk of infec-
tion will be similar (assuming that time spent with each contact is sufficient
for transmission). Under local count, their perceived risk and consequent
vaccination probability will be identical; under local prevalence, the solitary
individual will perceive higher risk (i.e., 100% of contacts infected) than the
gregarious individual. Under all models, overall vaccine coverage increases
as R0 increases, with the global prevalence achieving near universal coverage
by R0 = 5.
The relative and absolute impacts of each strategy are remarkably robust
to the transmissibility of the pathogen (Figure 3). Without vaccines, the
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Figure 3: Epidemiological impacts of decision strategies change with R0. (A) The propor-
tion of individuals that are infected increases and then declines slightly as R0 increases,
across all three decision strategies. (B) The proportion of individuals that choose to vac-
cinate initially increases sharply with R0 across all three strategies, but then declines for
only the local count strategy. (C) Herd immunity is the proportion of infections averted
per vaccinated individual, and is highest for the local count strategy across all R0. All
values are averages across 500 stochastic simulations.
expected epidemic size increases non-linearly with R0, reaching almost 100%
by R0 = 10 (Figure 3A). All of the vaccine strategies avert a large and
increasing fraction of cases, as R0 increases. In fact, the total epidemic size
is non-monotonic, with slightly more expected infections around R0 = 4 than
around R0 = 10. The local count strategy consistently yields the greatest
protection, followed by local prevalence.
The decision models result in dramatically different vaccination rates,
with the global prevalence strategy leading to near universal vaccination,
consistently more than double the coverage produced by the local count strat-
egy (Figure 3B). The population-level protection afforded by the local count
strategy exhibits a non-trivial trend with R0 (Figure 3C). Between R0 = 1
and R0 = 2, its impact grows logarithmically from less than one infection
averted per vaccinator to nearly two infections averted per vaccinator. The
indirect benefits then appear to grow exponentially, reaching three infections
averted per vaccinator when R0 = 9.
To explore the dynamic interactions between behavior and epidemiology
in the three models, we consider individual nodes based on their degree (num-
ber of contacts). In general, the higher the degree of a node, the higher their
risk for becoming infected and infecting others, and the greater the number
of local infections they could potentially perceive when making vaccination
decisions. Indeed, across all decision models, higher degree individuals vac-
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Figure 4: Vaccination decisions vary with degree. For each degree class, we graph (A)
the proportion of individuals that vaccinate (top) along with the epidemiological situation
at the time a node chooses to vaccinate in terms of the number of its infected neighbors
(middle) and the overall disease prevalence in the population (bottom). (B) The overall
exponential degree distribution in the population (red) on a log scale and the numbers of
individuals in each degree class that become infected without vaccination (gray) and un-
der each of the different vaccination strategies. Epidemiological risks—the chances of both
becoming infected and infecting others—generally increase with degree. The local count
strategy (light blue) is the only strategy for which the probability of vaccinating consis-
tently increases with risk. Compared to the two other strategies, high degree individuals
vaccinate earlier in terms of both local and global disease prevalence and, consequently,
are less likely to become infected. Values are averages across 500 simulations, assuming
R0 = 5.
cinate earlier, in terms of the fraction of the population infected at time of
vaccination (Figure 4A, bottom). However, when we consider the fraction
of individuals vaccinated in each degree class, the three models do not con-
sistently afford protection commensurate with risk (Figure 4A, top). Local
count is the only strategy that results in vaccination coverage that monotoni-
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cally increases with risk. Under global decision-making, coverage is inversely
related to risk, and under local prevalence, coverage peaks for moderately
connected individuals. By the time individuals choose to vaccinate under
the either of two suboptimal strategies, their local risk of infection is already
quite high (Figure 4A, middle), particularly for more gregarious individuals.
Although the vaccinating individuals are immediately protected, comparable
individuals (of the same degree class and local risk) who stochastically fail
to make the same low probability vaccination decision are likely to become
infected. Consequently, the risk of infection increases steeply with degree
under all models except local count (Figure 4B).
Finally, we consider the impact of the underlying contact network on the
interplay between transmission and vaccination dynamics (Figure 5). We
compare our focal exponential network to a uniform random network in which
all nodes have the same degree and a Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network.
The local count strategy robustly affords the most efficient population-level
protection, averting the maximum number of infections (or nearly maximum
in the case of the scale-free network and low R0) with the fewest vaccines.
4. Discussion
Public health interventions and individual-level adherence decisions can
profoundly influence the fate of unfolding epidemics. In this study, we as-
sume that individuals have access to a fully protective measure, such as self-
isolation, medical prophylaxis, or an immediately and completely efficacious
vaccine. We assume that individuals take action based on their perceived
short-term risk of infection and compare the epidemiological impacts of three
different plausible decision paradigms. They gauge personal risks based on
either direct knowledge of infected friends and family (number or fraction
of infected social contacts) or indirect information about population-level
prevalence, perhaps gleaned through news media.
Of the three decision models, global risk assessments prove least effec-
tive across a large range of disease scenarios (R0 ranging from one to ten).
Nearly all non-infected individuals eventually vaccinate, yet the total cases
more than double those occurring under the alternative strategies. There
is a mismatch between risk and action. Risk is highly variable in time and
space, given the heterogeneity of the underlying contact network and branch-
ing nature of transmission. Yet, the global model assumes that perceived risk
and the consequent likelihood of adherence is homogeneous throughout the
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Figure 5: Decision dynamics across social networks. We compare three different network
structures–homogeneous (top), exponential (middle), and scale-free (bottom)–and show
the susceptible (black), infected (dark gray) and vaccinated (light gray) for two different
values of R0. Results are averages across 500 stochastic simulations.
network, though variable in time. By the time global prevalence triggers
wide-spread action, the highest risk individuals have already been exposed
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and the lowest risk individuals may still not, and might never, require pro-
tection.
In contrast, when individuals make decisions based on local risk assess-
ments, the intervention efforts more closely track the epidemiological dynam-
ics. Tallying infected contacts rather than estimating the fraction of infected
contacts provides a more accurate indication of real-time risk and results
in more efficient intervention. Assuming that all social contacts are equally
likely to transmit disease, two out of three infected contacts carries the same
immediate risk as two out of ten. The advantage of local risk assessment
stems from two sources of variation in risk. First, disease transmission is an
inherently local process in which risk aggregates around currently infected
individuals. Second, this is magnified in realistically heterogeneous networks,
by the concentration of risk around the center (most connected individuals)
of the network.
Given infinite resources, all three of the decision paradigms would markedly
diminish an emerging outbreak. However, interventions may be constrained
by limited supplies or lack of population access to medical countermeasures,
such as vaccines or antimicrobials. Even social distancing measures, such as
self-isolation, may be limited by economic necessity—the need to go to work,
school or daycare—or care-giving obligations for extended family. While such
limitations should be formally analyzed, our simple analysis suggests that the
best paradigm for averting infections also requires the fewest resources. For
example, for a flu-like R0 of two, compare the local count strategy, where
individuals protect themselves as their number of infected friends and fam-
ily climb, to the global strategy, where decisions are based on population
prevalence. For every individual that takes action, almost two infections are
averted under the local strategy whereas less than one infection is averted
under the global strategy. Local counting results in far fewer total infections
(3% versus 13%) while requiring far less intervention resources (23% versus
60% of individuals taking protective action).
Several studies suggest that immunizing or isolating interventions should
target the most connected individuals in a population [38, 39, 37, 52]. How-
ever, we rarely know the full contact network of a population. As proxies,
we can target populations subgroups that tend to have high numbers of po-
tentially disease-spreading contacts, such as young and school-aged children
or health-care workers. We can also use biased sampling to identify highly
connected individuals, such as the random acquaintance strategy in which
random individuals are asked to name one of their social contact; individuals
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with more contacts are more likely to be named [58, 59, 60, 61]. In a sense,
the winning paradigm of our study—counting infected contacts—similarly
biases interventions efforts towards more connected parts of the network.
The more connected one is, the more likely one is to have several infected
contacts.
The model is intentionally simplistic, providing a best case scenario for
each of the three strategies. We assume that resources are unlimited, protec-
tion is immediate and complete, and adherence probabilities perfectly mirror
perceived risks. Furthermore, depending on the decision paradigm, individ-
uals fairly accurately estimate the infectiousness of the disease, their number
or fraction of infected social contacts, or the population average risk of infec-
tion. The model also assumes that individuals are short-sighted and make
reactive decisions to avert immediate threat. We conjecture that the quali-
tative results of our analysis—the optimality of assessing risk based on the
numbers of infected friends and family—are robust for a large class of ’on-
the-fly’ interventions that afford relatively rapid protection in the heat of an
epidemic, but may not apply to preventative measures taken early in an out-
break or those with long efficacy lags. (For example, see alternative models
presented in Supplement Figures S1 and S2).
As a final caveat, we highlight our assumption that all edges (contacts)
in our networks are equally likely to transmit disease. In reality, contacts
can be highly heterogeneous, with household and health care contacts far
more likely to transmit disease than casual social acquaintances. Our results
should be robust when such heterogeneity is distributed randomly throughout
the network. However, if individuals with more contacts tend to spend less
time with each one, then epidemiological risk may be more homogeneous
throughout the network and the advantage of the local decision strategies
reduced. Although we do not model this scenario directly, we considered a
homogeneous network where all individuals have the same number of contacts
(Figure 5). The local strategies still prevail, but their relative efficiency is
reduced, with far more vaccines required to achieve the same benefit.
This study prompts two practical questions. First, how do people ac-
tually make intervention decisions? Perhaps individuals fall nicely into one
of these three decision-making camps. More likely, individual risk assess-
ments are constrained by historical inertia [21, 23, 33, 41, 62], influenced
by decisions of friends and family [1, 3, 10, 25, 27, 41], and integrate in-
formation from a combination of local and global data sources of variable
reliability. Realistic decision models, driven by sociological survey data, can
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elucidate vaccine campaign failures and identify key pressure points for in-
creasing uptake. Second, how can we streamline intervention campaigns to
achieve efficient, rather than universal, adherence? This study reminds us
that more intervention is not necessarily better intervention. The decision
paradigm that most reduced transmission also required the least resources.
Given the simplicity of our model, we do not suggest that public health agen-
cies should promote ‘infection-counting’. Rather, we conclude that public
health agencies should prioritize local disease surveillance and risk commu-
nications efforts and believe that data-driven models can be instrumental in
designing effective outbreak information campaigns.
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Supplemental material
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we consider two alternative de-
cision strategies. The first is a threshold model in which individuals vaccinate
when their personal risk estimate (based on either the original local count,
local prevalence or global prevalence models) crosses a specified threshold
(Figure S1). The second is a delayed and imperfect vaccination model in
which individuals make decisions according to the original models, but vac-
cines are only 80% efficacious (i.e., 80% of vaccinators are fully protected;
20% remain susceptible), with immunity delayed by one day after the deci-
sion to vaccinate (Figure S2). We find qualitatively similar patterns, with
the local count strategy (tracking the number of infected contacts) typically
affording the greatest population-wide protection with the fewest vaccines.
The exception is that the local prevalence strategy averts more infections
than the local count strategy at intermediate decision thresholds, but re-
quires approximately double the number of vaccines to do so (Figure S1).
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Figure S1: Epidemiological outcomes for threshold-based vaccine decisions. Indi-
viduals determine infection risk according to local count, local prevalence or global preva-
lence strategies and then vaccinate when perceived risk crosses a specified vaccination
threshold (given along the x-axes), rather than vaccinating probabilistically according to
perceived risk. The average fraction of individuals in the population that (A) vaccinate
(and are not infected), (B) become infected (with or without vaccination), and (C) remain
susceptible as a function of the vaccination threshold. This analysis assumes R0 = 5.
Values are averages across 500 stochastic simulations.
23
Figure S2: Epidemiological outcomes for a delayed and imperfect vaccine. Indi-
viduals follow the original vaccination strategies, but experience a one-day delay between
deciding to vaccinate and becoming immune. Furthermore, the vaccine is assumed only
80% effective, meaning that 80% of vaccinating individuals enjoy full protection one day
after deciding to vaccinate and the remaining 20% of vaccinating individuals remain fully
susceptible. The graph shows the means and standard deviations in the fraction of indi-
viduals infected across 500 stochastic simulations, assuming R0 = 5.
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